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Abstract
Two new constructions of linear code pairs C2 ⊂ C1 are given for which the
codimension and the relative minimum distances M1(C1, C2), M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) are
good. By this we mean that for any two out of the three parameters the third
parameter of the constructed code pair is large. Such pairs of nested codes are
indispensable for the determination of good linear ramp secret sharing schemes
[40]. They can also be used to ensure reliable communication over asymmetric
quantum channels [54]. The new constructions result from carefully applying
the Feng-Rao bounds [21, 31] to a family of codes defined from multivariate
polynomials and Cartesian product point sets.
Keywords: asymmetric quantum code, CSS construction, Feng-Rao bound,
nested codes, ramp secret sharing, relative generalized Hamming weight, relative
minimum distance, wiretap channel of type II.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider pairs of linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ F
n
q where Fq is the finite
field with q elements. We are interested in the codimension ℓ = dimC1− dimC2 and
the relative minimum distances
M1(C1, C2) = min{wH(~c) | ~c ∈ C1\C2},
∗galindo@mat.uji.es
†olav@math.aau.dk
‡carrillf@mat.uji.es
§diego@math.aau.dk
1
M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) = min{wH(~c) | ~c ∈ C
⊥
2 \C
⊥
1 }.
Here wH(~c) means the Hamming weight of ~c. For any two out of three parameters
we aim to construct code pairs such that the two parameters are equal to some pre-
scribed values, whereas the last parameter is as large as possible. Our motivation for
studying the above problem is applications in ramp secret sharing, communication
over wiretap channels of type II, and asymmetric quantum coding.
We first explain the application in secret sharing. The application to wiretap
channels of type II is analogue. A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic method
to encode a secret into a set of shares, later to be distributed among participants,
so that only specified subsets of the participants can reconstruct the secret. The
first secret sharing scheme, proposed by Shamir [52], was a perfect scheme, meaning
that a set of participants unable to reconstruct the secret has no information on the
secret. Later non-perfect secret sharing schemes were proposed [7, 56] in which there
are sets of participants that have some information about the secret, but cannot
fully reconstruct it. In this paper we use the term ramp secret sharing schemes for
the general class of perfect or non-perfect schemes. Secret sharing has been applied,
for example, to store confidential information at multiple locations that are placed
geographically apart. When we use secret sharing schemes in such a scenario, the
likelihoods of both data loss and data theft are decreased. As far as we know, in
many applications both perfect and non-perfect ramp secret sharing schemes are
useful. In the perfect scheme the size of a share must be greater than or equal to that
of the secret [11]. In contrast ramp secret sharing schemes allow shares to be smaller
than the secret which for instance is useful for storing bulk data [14].
A linear ramp secret sharing scheme can be described as a coset construction
C1/C2 where C2 ⊂ C1 are linear codes [12]. More precisely, let dimC2 = k2, dimC1 =
k1 and ℓ = k1 − k2. Given a basis {~b1, . . . ,~bk2} for C2 as a vector space over Fq and
a corresponding basis {~b1, . . . ,~bk2 ,
~bk2+1, . . . ,
~bk1=k2+ℓ} for C1 the encoding of a secret
(s1, . . . , sℓ) ∈ F
ℓ
q is done by choosing a1, . . . , ak2 ∈ Fq randomly from a uniform
distribution and then constructing the codeword ~c = a1~b1 + · · ·+ ak2~bk2 + s1~bk2+1 +
· · ·+ sℓ~bk1 . The shares are the entries of ~c.
Definition 1. Given a ramp secret sharing scheme C1/C2 with ℓ = dimC1 − dimC2
we say that it has (t1, . . . , tℓ)-privacy and (r1, . . . , rℓ)-reconstruction if the positive
integers t1, . . . , tℓ are chosen as large as possible and the positive integers r1, . . . , rℓ
are chosen as small as possible such that
• for 1 ≤ v ≤ ℓ, an adversary cannot obtain v log2(q) bits of information about ~s
with any tv shares,
• for 1 ≤ v ≤ ℓ, it is possible to recover v log2(q) bits of information about ~s with
any collection of rv shares.
We shall refer to the numbers r1, . . . , rℓ as reconstruction numbers and similarly
call the numbers t1, . . . , tℓ privacy numbers. These parameters are motivated by the
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fact that the amount of information which an adversary can obtain is always an
integer times log2(q) bits and similar for the reconstruction. Of particular interest
are the first privacy number t = t1 and the last reconstruction number r = rℓ, as t
is the maximal number such that no set of this size leaks any information about the
secret, and r equals the smallest number such that any set of this size can recover the
entire secret. It was demonstrated in [5, 55, 40, 30] that the above numbers can be
uniquely determined from the relative generalized Hamming weights, that we shall
define now. For v = 1, . . . , ℓ
Mv(C1, C2) = min{#Supp U | U is a subspace of C1
of dimension v, U ∩ C2 = {~0}}
(and similar for the dual codes). Here, Supp U is the set of entries where some code-
word in U is non-zero and # is the cardinality. In our paper we shall adopt the
tradition of sometimes referring to relative generalized Hamming weights M1(C1, C2)
and M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) simply as relative minimum distances. Note that the relative min-
imum distance M1(C1, C2) can be lower bounded by the minimum distance of C1.
Similarly, the relative minimum distance M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) is greater than or equal to the
minimum distance of C⊥2 . The following theorem corresponds to [30, Theorem 3].
Theorem 2. Let C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ F
n
q with ℓ = dimC1 − dimC2 and consider the corre-
sponding ramp secret sharing scheme C1/C2. Then the reconstruction numbers and
privacy numbers satisfy
rv = n−Mℓ−v+1(C1, C2) + 1,
tv = Mv(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 )− 1,
for v = 1, . . . , ℓ.
Hence, if for instance we want to construct a ramp secret sharing scheme over Fq
with n participants, secrets of length ℓ, first privacy number equal to some t, and
last reconstruction number r as small as possible, what we need is exactly a pair
of nested codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ F
n
q of codimension ℓ with M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) = t + 1, and
M1(C1, C2) = n− r + 1 as large as possible.
Finally we explain in brief the use of nested codes in connection with asymmetric
quantum error-correcting codes, introduced in [54]. The study of good quantum
codes is by now a well-established research area. Some classical and recent references
are [10, 8, 9, 4, 6, 3, 47, 39]. Recently, such theory has been extended to asymmetric
quantum error-correcting codes which are useful in a model where the probabilities
of qubit-flip and phase-shift errors are different [38, 51, 19, 42, 41, 16, 17, 43, 44].
This generalization is motivated by the argument that dephasing will happen more
frequently than relaxation [38]. A linear q-ary asymmetric quantum error-correcting
code C is a qk dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space Cq
n
whose error basis is
defined by unitary operators usually denoted by X and Z. It is customary to write
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the parameters of C as [[n, k, dz/dx]]q which means that C corrects all phase-shift
errors up to ⌊dz−1
2
⌋, and all qudit-flip errors up to ⌊dx−1
2
⌋.
In the present paper we concentrate on the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) con-
struction of asymmetric quantum codes from a pair of nested linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆
Fnq . We leave it for the reader to inspect [9, 39] for the actual construction. Here, we
only give the following important result on the parameters of the resulting asymmetric
quantum code (see [51, Lemma 3.1]).
Theorem 3. Consider linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ F
n
q . Then the asymmetric quantum
code defined using the CSS construction has parameters
[[n, ℓ = dimC1 − dimC2, dz/dx]]q
where dz = M1(C1, C2) and dx = M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ).
Recall, that a stabilizer (symmetric) quantum code is the common eigenspace of
a commutative subgroup of the error group associated to the error basis (see [9, 39]
for details). The quantum codes in Theorem 3 can be considered as stabilizer asym-
metric quantum codes [51, Lemma 3.1]. Studying asymmetric quantum codes rather
than only symmetric codes is an important problem. For instance, already in [38] it
was identified that large ratios dz/dx are relevant – phase-flip errors occurring tens,
hundreds, or even thousands times more likely than bit-flips. From Theorem 3 it is
clear that dz ≥ d(C1) and dx ≥ d(C
⊥
2 ) where the expressions on the right sides are the
minimum distance of the classical code. There is a clear physical significance of cases
where strict inequality holds in at least one of these expressions. Such (asymmetric)
quantum codes are called impure (or degenerate) [1, 35] and it is known that the
impureness can be employed to obtain improved decoding.
As a measure for goodness of asymmetric quantum codes we shall use the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound from [45, Theorem 4] which we now recall:
Theorem 4. If
1− q−2ℓ
1− q−2n
·
1
qn−ℓ
dx−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i ·
dz−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i < 1
then there exists an [[n, ℓ, dz/dx]]q asymmetric quantum code.
The literature only reports few families of long asymmetric quantum codes, an
exception being La Guardia’s construction II in [44, Theorem 7.1] which we shall
compare our codes with. In another direction Ezerman et al’s works in [17, 18]
explain how to derive good asymmetric quantum codes with dx being very small and
ℓ being moderate. As our constructions do not seem to generally compare well with
these codes in the case of dx ∈ {2, 3} we omit such cases in our tables.
Having discussed both ramp secret sharing schemes and asymmetric quantum
codes we include a remark relating them to each other.
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Remark 5. There exists an asymmetric quantum code based on the CSS construction
with parameters [[n, ℓ, dz/dx]]q if and only there exists a linear ramp secret sharing
scheme over Fq with secrets in F
ℓ
q, with r = rℓ = n− dz + 1 and t = t1 = dx − 1.
As the tradition for reporting numerical data on parameters of (asymmetric) quan-
tum codes seems stronger than the tradition for reporting corresponding parameters
of ramp secret sharing schemes, throughout this paper we shall often report our find-
ings in the first setting. In such cases we leave it for the reader to apply Remark 5
to make the translation to secret sharing. On the other hand, higher relative weights
give information on ramp secret sharing schemes, whereas no implication for asym-
metric quantum codes seems to be known. Hence, when treating them we shall do it
in the setting of secret sharing.
In this paper we present two new families of long nested codes C2 ⊂ C1 with
M1(C1, C2) +M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) high. Such codes give rise to ramp secret sharing schemes
with r− t close to ℓ, and give rise to asymmetric quantum codes with dz+ dx close to
n − ℓ + 2. The code pairs are defined by evaluating multivariate polynomials at the
points of Cartesian products of subsets of finite fields, and the above mentioned two
families are found by carefully applying Feng-Rao theory [30]. Our first family is made
by combining, for the first time in the literature, the Feng-Rao improved code con-
structions for dual and primary codes. This leads to good pairs of codes, however, it
only works for relatively high codimension ℓ. The asymmetric quantum codes related
to this first family of nested codes compare very favorably with known asymmetric
quantum codes of similar length as well as the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Moreover,
the construction is very flexible and we can choose dz/dx very large, which as already
mentioned can be desirable. Our second family is a completely new construction
which produces very good parameters in the case of relatively small codimension
ℓ. Again the corresponding asymmetric quantum codes compare favorably with the
known codes of similar length and similarly with the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Even
more, we demonstrate a strong advantage of using our estimates on the relative min-
imum distances M1(C1, C2) and M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ); rather than just using information on
the minimum distances d(C1) and d(C
⊥
2 ). Actually, using only information on the
minimum distances d(C1) and d(C
⊥
2 ) – which is often done in the literature – it seems
in many cases impossible to establish the code parameters for asymmetric quantum
codes, which we are able to obtain. These reflections are closely related to the fact
that the corresponding asymmetric quantum codes of relatively small dimension are
almost always impure, which as already mentioned is desirable. Again the construc-
tion is quite flexible in the sense that we can choose the ratio dz/dx very high if
requested. For both families of codes we provide generator matrices, and we also
describe a method for estimating higher relative weights Mv(C1, C2), Mv(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ),
v = 2, . . . , ℓ, which sometimes leads to closed formula expressions. Recall, that such
parameters express the information leakage and message recovery in connection with
ramp secret sharing. As a result it is shown that for our second family of nested codes,
the security of the related secret sharing schemes is much better than expected from
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studying only t = t1. Furthermore, for certain choices of Cartesian product point
sets also parity check matrices can easily be obtained, namely for the particular cases
where the considered codes satisfy the conditions for being so-called J-affine variety
codes [26]. Finally, all considered codes in this paper can be decoded up to half their
designed minimum distance by applying known decoding algorithms. The dual codes
can furthermore be decoded up to half the designed relative minimum distance. These
observations lead to decoding algorithms for the corresponding asymmetric quantum
codes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by recalling the Feng-Rao
bounds for primary and dual linear codes and we apply them to the general class
of codes derived by evaluating multivariate polynomials at Cartesian product point
sets. In this section we provide all needed background on Feng-Rao theory – for basic
results on multivariate polynomials and related concepts we refer the reader to [13].
The section concludes with a discussion on how to decode the related asymmetric
quantum codes. Then, in Section 3, we explain how to employ the Feng-Rao improved
code constructions for primary and dual codes simultaneously to obtain good families
of nested codes with relatively high codimension. We then study the corresponding
ramp secret sharing schemes and asymmetric quantum codes. In Section 4 we present
the new good construction of nested codes with relatively small codimension and we
study the corresponding ramp secret sharing schemes and asymmetric quantum codes.
Section 5 gives concluding remarks on the connection to J-affine variety codes. The
paper contains a number of examples, the end of which we indicate by ♦s.
2 Codes defined from Cartesian product point sets
In this paper we consider families of code pairs C2 ⊂ C1 defined by evaluating multi-
variate polynomials at the points of Cartesian products of subsets of finite fields. For
the applications described in the previous section, we are interested in the parameters
Mv(C1, C2) (the primary case) as well as Mv(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) (the dual case) – with a special
focus on the relative minimum distances M1(C1, C2) and M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ). To handle the
primary case only it would be natural to use the language of Gröbner basis theory
and to apply the so-called footprint bound [50, 36, 28]. However, in this language it
is more difficult to treat the dual case and we therefore give a coherent description of
both cases using the Feng-Rao bounds for general linear codes instead. The Feng-Rao
bounds come in two versions, namely one for primary codes [2, 32, 31, 30] and another
for dual codes [20, 21, 22, 48, 37, 46, 30].
Our exposition follows the presentation in [30, Section IV] and is illustrated with
a continued example. This continued example, at the end of the present section,
leads to the introduction of a general class of code pairs for which we have a simple
description of generator matrices, where we know the codimension, and where we can
easily estimate the relative minimum distances and also the higher relative weights
(Theorem 16). It is from this class of code pairs we, in the following sections, show
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how to choose optimal pairs when the codimension is relatively large (Section 3), and
when it is relatively small (Section 4).
Consider a fixed basis B = {~b1, . . . ,~bn} for F
n
q as a vector space over Fq and let
I = {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 6. Define ρ¯ : Fnq → I ∪ {0} to be the function given as follows. For
non-zero ~c we have ρ¯(~c) = i where i is the unique integer such that
~c ∈ Span{~b1, . . . ,~bi}\Span{~b1, . . . ,~bi−1}.
Here we use the convention that Span ∅ = {~0}. Finally, let ρ¯(~0) = 0.
Throughout the paper by ≺deg we shall always mean the degree lexicographic
ordering given by the rule that for two different monomials we have X i11 · · ·X
im
m ≺deg
Xj11 · · ·X
jm
m if one of the following conditions holds:
1. i1 + · · ·+ im < j1 + · · ·+ jm
2. i1 + · · ·+ im = j1 + · · ·+ jm, but the rightmost non-zero entry of
(j1 − i1, . . . , jm − im) is positive.
In case of two variables X and Y , we shall always think of X as X1 and Y as
X2. In the paper we shall also need other monomial orderings ≺, however, the degree
lexicographic ordering will play a particular important role.
Example 1. Consider the ideal I = 〈X6 − 1, Y 6 − 1〉 ⊂ F7[X, Y ] and the residue
class ring R = F7[X, Y ]/I. The corresponding variety consists of all pairs of non-zero
elements of F7, hence we may write VFq(I) = {P1, . . . , P36}. Let ev : R → F
36
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the vector space homomorphism given by ev(F + I) = (F (P1), . . . , F (P36)). The set
B = {ev(X iY j + I) | 0 ≤ i, j < 6} then constitutes a basis for F367 as a vector space
over F7. To see this, we first observe that
ev(F (X, Y ) + I) = ev
(
F (X, Y )− A(X, Y )(X6 − 1)−B(X, Y )(Y 6 − 1) + I
)
for any A(X, Y ), B(X, Y ) ∈ F7[X, Y ], which implies that we may, without loss of
generality, assume that degX F, degY F < 6. Using Lagrange interpolation it holds
that ev is surjective, and as #B equals the dimension of the image F367 B is indeed a
basis – and consequently ev is an isomorphism. We next enumerate B according to
the degree lexicographic ordering ≺deg. The enumeration is illustrated in Figure 1.
As an example we obtain ρ¯(ev(2X5Y 4 + 5X3Y 2 + 4 + I)) = 34. ♦
Recall, that the component wise product of two vectors in Fnq is given by
(α1, . . . , αn) ∗ (β1, . . . , βn) = (α1β1, . . . , αnβn).
Using this product we can now introduce the concept of one-way well-behaving pairs.
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Y 5 XY 5 X2Y 5 X3Y 5 X4Y 5 X5Y 5
Y 4 XY 4 X2Y 4 X3Y 4 X4Y 4 X5Y 4
Y 3 XY 3 X2Y 3 X3Y 3 X4Y 3 X5Y 3
Y 2 XY 2 X2Y 2 X3Y 2 X4Y 2 X5Y 2
Y XY X2Y X3Y X4Y X5Y
1 X X2 X3 X4 X5
~b21 ~b26 ~b30 ~b33 ~b35 ~b36
~b15 ~b20 ~b25 ~b29 ~b32 ~b34
~b10 ~b14 ~b19 ~b24 ~b28 ~b31
~b6 ~b9 ~b13 ~b18 ~b23 ~b27
~b3 ~b5 ~b8 ~b12 ~b17 ~b22
~b1 ~b2 ~b4 ~b7 ~b11 ~b16
Figure 1: The enumeration of B in Example 1
Definition 7. An ordered pair (i, j) ∈ I × I is said to be one-way well-behaving
(OWB) if ρ¯(~bi′ ∗~bj) < ρ¯(~bi ∗~bj) holds true for all i
′ ∈ I with i′ < i.
Example 2. This is a continuation of Example 1. Consider ~bi = ev(X
αY β + I) and
~bj = ev(X
γY δ+I) (where, by assumption, 0 ≤ α, β, γ, δ < 6). The pair (i, j) is OWB
if and only if α+γ < 6 and β+δ < 6 hold simultaneously. To see the “if” part note that
if XηY λ ≺deg X
αY β then the leading monomial M of the remainder of Xη+γY λ+δ
after division with {X6 − 1, Y 6 − 1} satisfies M deg X
η+γY λ+δ ≺deg X
α+γY β+δ
which follows from the properties of a monomial ordering and those of the division
algorithm. The “only if” part has to do with the special form of the ideal I coming
from a variety which is a Cartesian product. If for instance, α + γ ≥ 6 then letting
η = 6−γ−1 we obtain XηY β ≺deg X
αY β, but the leading monomial N of Xη+γY β+δ
after division with {X6− 1, Y 6− 1} has the same Y -part as the leading monomial of
Xα+γY β+δ after division with {X6 − 1, Y 6 − 1}, but higher X-part. ♦
To formulate the Feng-Rao bound for primary codes we shall need the following
set.
Definition 8. For i ∈ I define
Λi = {l ∈ I | ∃ j ∈ I such that (i, j) is OWB and ρ¯(~bi ∗~bj) = l}.
Given a v-dimensional vector space U ⊆ Fnq then ρ¯(U\{~0}) is of size v. The following
proposition, known as the Feng-Rao bound for primary codes [30, Proposition 8],
therefore is operational.
Proposition 9. Let U ⊆ Fnq be a vector space of dimension at least 1. The support
size of U satisfies
#Supp (U) ≥ # ∪i∈ρ¯(U\{~0}) Λi. (1)
Example 3. This is a continuation of the previous examples. We have ~b28 =
ev(X4Y 3 + I) and therefore
#Λ28 = #{X
4Y 3, X5Y 3, X4Y 4, X5Y 4, X4Y 5, X5Y 5} = 6.
In general, for ~bi = ev(X
αY β + I) (with 0 ≤ α, β < 6) we have #Λi = (6−α)(6− β).
The situation is depicted in Figure 2.
8
6 5 4 3 2 1
12 10 8 6 4 2
18 15 12 9 6 3
24 20 16 12 8 4
30 25 20 15 10 5
36 30 24 18 12 6
Figure 2: #Λi from Example 1 (enumeration with respect to Figure 1)
Let F (X, Y ) be a polynomial whose leading monomial with respect to ≺deg is
XαY β for some 0 ≤ α, β < 6. Consider ~c = ev(F + I), then, by Proposition 9,
wH(~c) ≥ (6 − α)(6 − β). In general, Figure 2 gives upper bounds on the Hamming
weights of all possible words in F367 . ♦
We now turn to relative generalized Hamming weights. Note that although C2 ⊂
C1 implies ρ¯(C2) ⊂ ρ¯(C1), it does not always hold that ~c ∈ C1\C2 implies ρ¯(~c) ∈
ρ¯(C1)\ρ¯(C2). Nevertheless, the Feng-Rao bound for primary codes [30, Theorem 9]
still gives us useful information.
Theorem 10. Consider two linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ F
n
q with dim(C1) = k1 and
dim(C2) = k2. Let u be the smallest element in ρ¯(C1) that is not in ρ¯(C2). For
v = 1, . . . , ℓ = k1 − k2 we have
Mv(C1, C2) ≥ min
{
# ∪vs=1 Λis | u ≤ i1 < · · · < iv and i1, . . . , iv ∈ ρ¯(C1\{~0})
}
.
Example 4. This is a continuation of the previous examples. If C2 = Span{~b1,~b2,~b3,~b5}
and C1 = Span{~b1,~b2,~b3,~b4,~b5} then
M1(C1, C2) ≥ min{#Λ4,#Λ5} = min{24, 25} = 24.
However, if C2 = Span{~b1,~b2,~b3,~b4}, while C1 is unchanged, then M1(C1, C2) ≥
#Λ5 = 25. ♦
To treat dual codes we shall need the following definitions, where the first can
be considered as the counterpart of Definition 8, and the last as the counterpart of
Definition 6.
Definition 11. For l ∈ I define
Vl = {i ∈ I | ρ¯(~bi ∗~bj) = l for some ~bj ∈ B with (i, j) OWB}.
Definition 12. For ~c ∈ Fnq\{~0} define η(~c) to be the smallest number l ∈ I such that
~c ·~bl 6= 0. Here ~a ·~b means the Euclidean inner product between ~a and ~b.
Given a v-dimensional space U , η(U\{~0}) is of size v. The following proposi-
tion, known as the Feng-Rao bound for dual codes [30, Proposition 13], therefore is
operational.
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Proposition 13. Let U ⊆ Fnq be a space of dimension at least 1. We have
#Supp(U) ≥ # ∪l∈η(U\{~0}) Vl.
Example 5. This is a continuation of the previous examples. For ~bl = ev(X
αY β+ I)
(with 0 ≤ α, β < 6) we have #Vl = (α + 1)(β + 1). Given ~c with η(~c) = l, from
Proposition 13 we obtain wH(~c) ≥ (α+ 1)(β + 1). By Proposition 13, Figure 3 gives
upper bounds on the Hamming weights of all possible words in F367 . ♦
6 12 18 24 30 36
5 10 15 20 25 30
4 8 12 16 20 24
3 6 9 12 15 18
2 4 6 8 10 12
1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 3: #Vl from Example 4 (enumeration with respect to Figure 1)
We next treat relative generalized Hamming weights. Note that for C2 ⊂ C1 it
does not in general hold that ~c ∈ C⊥2 \C
⊥
1 implies η(~c) ∈ ρ¯(C1\{~0}). Nevertheless, the
Feng-Rao bound for dual codes [30, Theorem 14] still gives us useful information.
Theorem 14. Consider linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊆ F
n
q . Let u
⊥ be the largest element in
ρ¯(C1\{~0}). For v = 1, . . . , dim(C1)− dim(C2) = dim(C
⊥
2 )− dim(C
⊥
1 ) we have
Mv(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) ≥ min{# ∪
v
s=1 Vis | 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < iv ≤ u
⊥, i1, . . . , iv /∈ ρ¯(C2)}.
Example 6. This is a continuation of the previous examples. If C2 = Span{~b1,~b2,~b3,~b4}
and C1 = Span{~b1,~b2,~b3,~b4,~b6}, then
M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) ≥ min{#V5,#V6} = min{4, 3} = 3.
However, if C1 = Span{~b1,~b2,~b3,~b4,~b5} while C2 is unchanged then M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) ≥
#V5 = 4. ♦
The above theorems and examples lead us to consider the following family of
codes, which have a good behavior with respect to the applications described in the
introduction. Consider a Cartesian product S = S1×· · ·×Sm ⊆ F
m
q . For i = 1, . . . , m
define the one-variable polynomial
Fi(Xi) =
∏
α∈Si
(Xi − α), (2)
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and consider the vanishing ideal of S, I = 〈F1(X1), . . . , Fm(Xm)〉 ⊂ Fq[X1, . . . , Xm].
We write R = Fq[X1, . . . , Xm]/I and enumerate S as S = {α1, . . . αn}, where n =
#S =
∏m
i=1 si. Here, we use the notation si = #Si. As in the above examples we
then obtain a vector space homomorphism ev : R → Fnq defined by ev(F + I) =
(F (α1), . . . , F (αn)). Now let
∆(s1, . . . , sm) = {X
i1
1 · · ·X
im
m | 0 ≤ it < st, t = 1, . . . , m} = {N1, . . . , Nn},
where the enumeration of the Ni’s is with respect to an arbitrary (but fixed) monomial
ordering ≺. For general L ⊆ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) define
C(L) = Span{ev(X i11 · · ·X
im
m + I) | X
i1
1 · · ·X
im
m ∈ L},
which is clearly a code of length n. For the purpose of applying the Feng-Rao bounds
to the codes C(L) and C(L)⊥ we introduce functions D and D⊥.
Definition 15. Given X i11 · · ·X
im
m ∈ ∆(s1, . . . , sm), define
D(X i11 · · ·X
im
m ) =
m∏
t=1
(st − it) and D
⊥(X i11 · · ·X
im
m ) =
m∏
t=1
(it + 1).
More generally, for K ⊆ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) let
D(K) = #{N ∈ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) | N is divisible by some M ∈ K},
D⊥(K) = #{N ∈ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) | N divides some M ∈ K}.
Observe that D(X i11 , . . . , X
im
m ) = D({X
i1
1 , . . . , X
im
m }) and D
⊥(X i11 , . . . , X
im
m ) =
D⊥({X i11 , . . . , X
im
m }).
We are now ready to describe the relative parameters of the evaluation codes
introduced above.
Theorem 16. Consider S = S1 × · · · × Sm ⊆ F
m
q and L2 ⊂ L1 ⊆ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) =
{N1, . . . , Nn} where the enumeration of the Ni’s is with respect to an arbitrary (but
fixed) monomial ordering ≺. Then the codes C(L1) and C(L2) are of length n and
their codimension equals #L1 − #L2. Furthermore, for v = 1, . . . ,#L1 − #L2 we
have
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min{D(K) | K ⊆ {Nu, . . . , Nn} ∩ L1,#K = v}, (3)
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min{D⊥(K) | K ⊆ {N1, . . . Nu⊥}\L2,#K = v}, (4)
where u = min{i | Ni ∈ L1\L2} and u
⊥ = max{i | Ni ∈ L1}.
Proof. We start by proving that {ev(N1 + I), . . . , ev(Nn + I)} is a basis for F
n
q as a
vector space over Fq. This fact implies that the dimension of C(Li) equals #Li, i =
1, 2, and the formula for the codimension follows. Observe that
ev(F (X1, . . . , Xm) + I) = ev
(
F (X1, . . . , Xm)− A1(X1, . . . , Xm)F1(X1)− · · ·
− Am(X1, . . . , Xm)Fm(X1, . . . , Xm) + I
)
11
for any polynomials A1, . . . , Am in the variables X1, . . .Xm with coefficients in Fq.
Hence, we may assume that degX1 F < degF1 = s1, . . ., degXm F < degFm = sm.
Using Lagrange-interpolation we next see that ev is surjective and, as ∆(s1, . . . , sm)
is of the same size as the image Fnq , the considered set is indeed a basis for F
n
q . As
in the above examples we enumerate the basis elements {~b1 = ev(N1 + I), . . . ,~bn =
ev(Nn + I)} (meaning that we order it according to the monomial ordering ≺).
Notice that, regardless of the choice of monomial ordering ≺, D(Ni) ≤ #Λi, and
that in larger generality1 D({Ni1, . . . , Nim}) ≤ #∪
m
t=1 Λit. Therefore (3) follows from
Theorem 10. Similarly, regardless of the choice of monomial ordering ≺, D⊥(Ni) ≤
#Vi and in larger generality
2 D⊥({Ni1 , . . . , Nim}) ≤ # ∪
m
t=1 Vit . Hence, (4) follows
from Theorem 14.
In the next two sections we show a way to choose L2 ⊂ L1 such that the parameters
ℓ = dimC(L1)−dimC(L2) = #L1−#L2,M1(C(L1), C(L2)), andM1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥)
are good. We study two separate cases. The first case, which we treat in Section 3,
deals with relatively large codimension. The second case, which we treat in Section 4,
concerns relatively small codimensions.
Before studying these two families of codes we briefly discuss the decoding of
the related asymmetric quantum codes. Observe that the decoding algorithm for
order domain codes described in [37, Section 6.3] can be applied in the more general
setting of linear codes with Feng-Rao designed minimum distance. Hence, it can
be applied to all codes of the present paper. This holds both for dual codes [46]
and primary codes [31]. The decoding algorithm which corrects errors up to half
the designed minimum distance uses O(n3) operations, where n is the length of the
code. In [15, Appendix A] Duursma and Park provided a similar algorithm correcting
errors up to half the designed relative minimum distance. This was done at the
general level of linear codes described by means of their parity check matrix. The
application in connection with decoding of asymmetric quantum codes is as follows.
To decode both phase-shift and qudit-flip errors up to half the designed values of
dz and dx one will need two decoding algorithms, namely one which decodes up to
⌊(M1(C1, C2)− 1)/2⌋ errors in connection with C2 ⊂ C1, and another which corrects
up to ⌊(M1(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) − 1)/2⌋ errors in connection with C
⊥
1 ⊂ C
⊥
2 [10, 9]. Duursma
and Park’s algorithm applies to the last task, but not to the first in its present form.
It is an open research problem to modify the decoding algorithm from [15] for general
nested dual codes, so that it also works for nested primary codes. This probably
could be done using the material in [31]. In the absence of such a translation one may
instead apply the algorithm from [31] to correct only up to ⌊(d(C1)− 1)/1⌋ errors in
connection with the primary nested codes.
1Actually equalities hold – which can be seen by applying similar arguments as in Example 2 –
but we shall not need this fact.
2Actually again equalities hold, but we shall not need this fact.
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3 Relatively large codimension
One of the nice features of the Feng-Rao bounds is that they come with improved
code constructions. In the setting of the codes in the previous section, by applying
the improved construction for primary codes [2], we obtain a code C(L1) of designed
distance δ and maximal dimension if we choose
L1 = {X
i1
1 · · ·X
im
m ∈ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) | D(X
i1
1 · · ·X
im
m ) ≥ δ}. (5)
Similarly, by applying the improved construction for dual codes [21, 22] we obtain a
code C(L2)
⊥ of designed distance δ⊥ and maximal dimension if we choose
L2 = {X
i1
1 · · ·X
im
m ∈ ∆(s1, . . . , sm) | D
⊥(X i11 · · ·X
im
m ) < δ
⊥}. (6)
Our first proposal for constructing good pairs of nested codes is to choose L1 and L2
as in (5) and (6) with L2 ⊂ L1. We then obtain
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ d(C(L1)) ≥ δ, (7)
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ d(C(L2)
⊥) ≥ δ⊥. (8)
The codimension ℓ = #L1−#L2 is the largest possible with these designed parameters
as, by Proposition 9 and Proposition 13, L1 is as large as possible and L2 is as small
as possible, such that (7) and (8) hold. Observe that (7) and (8) are independent of
the choice of monomial ordering ≺ in Theorem 16, as the integers u and u′ from that
theorem play no role here. Note that D(X i11 · · ·X
im
m ) = δ is a concave function on
the domain under consideration, while D⊥(X i11 · · ·X
im
m ) = δ
⊥ is a convex function.
Therefore the necessary condition that L2 ⊂ L1 creates a restriction on how small
a codimension can be for each fixed value of δ (low codimensions require another
method which we describe in the next section). The following theorem summarizes
the method described.
Theorem 17. With the above notation, fix two positive integers δ and δ⊥ such
that the monomial sets L1 and L2 described in (5) and (6), respectively, satisfy
that L2 ⊂ L1. Then the evaluation codes C(L2) ⊂ C(L1) are of codimension ℓ =
#L1 − #L2, and the relative minimum distances satisfy M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ δ and
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ δ⊥.
Remark 18. The case δ = δ⊥ and S = Fmq is studied in [25, 27] in connection with
symmetric quantum codes. There it is characterized when the corresponding sets L1
and L2 satisfy the inclusion L2 ⊂ L1.
Remark 19. It is possible to show that d(C(L1)) = M1(C(L1), C(L2)), but for
general Cartesian product point sets it is unsettled if
d(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) = M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥),
leaving it undecided if the related asymmetric quantum codes are pure or not.
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Below we analyze the parameters of the nested code pairs in Theorem 17 when
the sets S1, . . . , Sm are all of the same size, but first we illustrate the theorem with
an example.
Example 7. This is a continuation of the examples in Section 2 where we considered
S = F∗7 ∗ F
∗
7. From Figure 2 we see that for δ = 12 the set L1 in (5) becomes
L1 = {1, X, Y,X
2, XY, Y 2, X3, X2Y,XY 2, Y 3, X4,
X3Y,X2Y 2, XY 3, Y 4, X3Y 2, X2Y 3}. (9)
Hence, #L1 = 17. According to Figure 3, δ
⊥ = 6 is the highest possible value
of δ⊥ such that all XαY β ∈ ∆(6, 6) with D⊥(XαY β) < δ⊥ also belong to L1. The
corresponding set L2 in (6) then becomes
L2 = {1, X, Y,X
2, XY, Y 2, X3, Y 3, X4, Y 4} (10)
which is of size 10. Hence, the codimension between C(L1) and C(L2) is 7, and
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ 12 andM1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ 6. In a similar fashion we obtain
the remaining parameters in Table 1. Note that if we have a code pair C(L2) ⊂ C(L1)
with designed parameters δ = a, δ⊥ = b and #L1−#L2 = ℓ then there exist L
′
2 ⊂ L
′
1
with designed parameters of C(L′2) ⊂ C(L
′
1) being δ = b, δ
⊥ = a and #L′1−#L
′
2 = ℓ.
Hence, in Table 1 we only list parameters with δ ≥ δ⊥. We also exclude cases with
δ⊥ = 1 (corresponding to C2 = {~0}). ♦
In the following we find closed formula expressions for the parameters of the coset
construction in Theorem 17 when S1, . . . , Sm are all of the same size. We start with
a lemma explaining for which choices of δ and δ⊥ the theorem works.
Lemma 20. Assume s = s1 = · · · = sm and consider δ ∈ {1, . . . , s
m}. Let v ∈
{0, . . . , m− 1} be such that sv ≤ δ ≤ sv+1. If δ⊥ ≤ ⌊(s− δ
sv
+ 1)sm−v−1⌋ then the set
L2 from (6) is contained in the set L1 from (5).
Proof. Define functions D˜ : Qm → Q and D˜⊥ : Qm → Q by D˜((i1, . . . , im)) =∏m
t=1(s − it) and D˜
⊥((i1, . . . , im)) =
∏m
t=1(it + 1). Let i = s − δ/s
v and note that
0 ≤ i ≤ s− 1 as well as
D˜((0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
v times
, i, s− 1, . . . , s− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1−v times
)) = δ
hold true. Finally we observe that
D˜⊥((0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
v times
, i, s− 1, . . . , s− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1−v times
)) = (s−
δ
sv
+ 1)sm−v−1
and the lemma follows.
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ℓ 2 1 3 1 3 5 3 5 7 2 5 7 9
δ 30 25 25 24 24 24 20 20 20 18 18 18 18
δ⊥ 2 3 2 4 3 2 4 3 2 5 4 3 2
ℓ 3 6 8 10 5 8 10 12 7 9 12 14 16
δ 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 12 12 12 12 12
δ⊥ 5 4 3 2 5 4 3 2 6 5 4 3 2
ℓ 9 11 14 16 18 10 12 15 17 19 12 14 17
δ 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8
δ⊥ 6 5 4 3 2 6 5 4 3 2 6 5 4
ℓ 19 21 16 18 21 23 25 20 23 25 27 26 28
δ 8 8 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4
δ⊥ 3 2 6 5 4 3 2 5 4 3 2 4 3
ℓ 30 30 32 34
δ 4 3 3 2
δ⊥ 2 3 2 2
Table 1: Parameters from Example 7.
The next step in our analysis is to establish an estimate from below on the di-
mension of the code C(L1) and C(L2)
⊥ when L1 is as in (5), L2 is as in (6) and
s = s1 = · · · = sm. In [29, Theorem 1] a bound was given for the special case
S1 = · · · = Sm = Fq and q
m−1 ≤ δ, δ⊥ ≤ qm. With the last mentioned condition
we do not obtain L2 ⊂ L1 and we therefore now generalize the result from [29] to
arbitrary 1 ≤ δ⊥, δ ≤ sm and s = s1 = · · · = sm. We start with a technical lemma,
whose proof we give in Appendix A.
Lemma 21. For m ≥ 2, 1 ≤ i ≤ m it holds that∫ s− τ
sm−i(s−x1)···(s−xi−1)
0
∫ s− τ
sm−i−1(s−x1)···(s−xi)
0
· · ·
∫ s− τ
(s−x1)···(s−xm−1)
0
dxm · · ·dxi+1 dxi
= sm−i+1 −
m−i∑
t=0
1
t!
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)
(
ln
(
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)s
m−i+1
τ
))t
.
From this lemma we obtain information on the dimensions of the codes as follows.
Theorem 22. Let s = s1 = · · · = sm and consider L1 and L2 as in (5) and (6),
respectively with δ = δ⊥ = τ ∈ {1, . . . , sm}. The dimensions of C(L1) and C(L2)
⊥
are at least
sm −
m∑
t=1
1
(t− 1)!
τ
(
ln
(sm
τ
))t−1
. (11)
15
If 1 ≤ τ < s then the dimensions are at least
sm −
m∑
t=1
1
(t− 1)!
τ((m− 1) ln(τ))t−1 (12)
which is sharper than (11).
Proof. By symmetry is is enough to prove the result for C(L1). The dimension of
C(L1), i.e. the number of integer tupples (i1, . . . , im) ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1}
m with (s −
i1) · · · (s− im) ≥ τ , is at least that of the volume of
{(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0, s]
m | (s− x1) · · · (s− xm) ≥ τ}
which corresponds to the integral in Lemma 21 when i is chosen to be equal to
1. This proves (11). Next, assume 1 ≤ τ < s. The above mentioned set of integer
tupples can be divided into two sets, the first set consisting of those tupples satisfying
0 ≤ iv < s−τ for some v ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and the second set consisting of those tupples
satisfying s− τ ≤ iv for v = 1, . . . , m. The number of elements in the first set equals
sm − τm. The cardinality of the second set is estimated from below by the volume of
{(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ [0, τ ]
m | (τ − x1) · · · (τ − xm) ≥ τ}.
The last part of the theorem now follows by applying Lemma 21 with i = 1 and
s = τ .
Remark 23. From Theorem 22 one obtains for each choice of m closed formula lower
bounds on the rate k/n as a function of the relative minimum distance3 d/n. Such
estimates are independent of the actual value of s. From the proof it is clear that
these estimates become more and more precise as s increases. Computer experiments
reveal that with m = 2 and m = 3 already for s = 32 the true values of the rate is
almost the same as the estimated.
Using the constructions described in Section 1 we get by applying Lemma 20 in
combination with (11) from Theorem 22 the following result on the existence of ramp
secret sharing schemes and asymmetric quantum codes.
Theorem 24. Consider integers m ≥ 2 and s ≤ q, where q is a prime power. Given
δ ∈ {1, . . . , sm} let v ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} be such that sv ≤ δ ≤ sv+1 and choose an
integer δ⊥ ≤ ⌊(s− δ
sv
+ 1)sm−v−1⌋. From Theorem 17 we obtain ramp secret sharing
schemes over Fq with n = s
m participants, shares in Fℓq where
ℓ ≥ sm −
m∑
t=1
1
(t− 1)!
(
δ
(
ln
(sm
δ
))t−1
+ δ⊥
(
ln
(sm
δ⊥
))t−1)
,
3Here, the relative minimum distance should not be confused with the first relative generalized
Hamming weight.
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the first privacy number satisfying t = t1 ≥ δ
⊥−1 and the last reconstruction number
satisfying r = rℓ ≤ s
m − δ + 1. Similarly, we obtain asymmetric quantum codes with
parameters
[[n = sm, ℓ, dz ≥ δ/dx ≥ δ
⊥]]q.
Remark 25. The lower bound on ℓ in Theorem 24 can be improved in the case
1 ≤ δ < s or 1 ≤ δ⊥ < s by applying (12) instead of (11).
Recall from Remark 5 that studying asymmetric quantum codes derived from
the CSS construction is equivalent to studying linear ramp secret sharing schemes.
Therefore, the following discussion on asymmetric quantum codes imposed by The-
orem 17 can be directly translated into results on ramp secret sharing schemes. We
leave the details for the reader. It seems relevant to compare in some concrete cases
what can be derived from Theorem 17 in combination with Theorem 3 with other gen-
eral constructions in the literature of asymmetric quantum codes of similar length.
Applying Theorem 17 to polynomials in two variables and to a Cartesian product
S = S1 × S2 we obtain from Theorem 3 asymmetric stabilizer codes of length s1s2,
where s1 = #S1 and s2 = #S2. For comparison La Guardia’s Construction II of
asymmetric quantum generalized Reed-Solomon codes [44, Theorem 7.1] gives codes
of length m1m2 as follows:
Theorem 26. Let q be a prime power. Then there exist asymmetric quantum gener-
alized Reed-Solomon codes with parameters
[[m1m2, ℓ = m1(2k −m2 + c), dz ≥ d/dx ≥ (d− c)]]q,
where 1 < k < m2 < 2k+ c ≤ q
m1, k = m2 − d+ 1, and m2, d > c+1, c ≥ 1, m1 ≥ 1
are integers.
Observe that the bound dz ≥ m2 − k + 1 in Theorem 26 suggests that to obtain
the widest variety of code parameters for a given code length one should choose m1
smallest possible and m2 largest possible, such that the conditions in the theorem are
satisfied. The surprising consequence – which we illustrate in the following example
– is that sometimes one obtains better parameters from Theorem 26 by considering a
shorter code length. Adding 0s to the code words of the shorter code, we then obtain
bounds on codes of the right length.
Example 8. We first consider asymmetric quantum codes with q = 7 and of length
49. Applying Theorem 26 directly to the case of n = 49 we obtain six different sets
of parameters. However, we can actually derive better information on codes of length
49 by applying Theorem 26 to codes of length n = 48. In Table 2 a selection of
such parameters are compared with examples of what can be achieved by applying
Theorem 17 instead. In the table, by “—–” we indicate that no comparable parameters
can be derived. The advantage of our method is clear in most cases. Furthermore, all
the codes in Table 2 coming from Theorem 17 strictly exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound (Theorem 4).
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Theorem 26 ([44, Theorem 7.1]) Theorem 17
—– [[49, 3, 30/4]]7
—– [[49, 8, 24/4]]7
—– [[49, 5, 24/5]]7
—– [[49, 9, 20/5]]7
[[49, 10, 14/7]]7 [[49, 10, 14/7]]7
[[49, 12, 14/6]]7 [[49, 14, 14/6]]7
[[49, 16, 12/6]]7 [[49, 18, 12/6]]7
[[49, 18, 10/7]]7 [[49, 16, 10/7]]7
Table 2: Comparison of code parameters in Example 8. Parameters from applying
Theorem 26 to codes of length n = 48 on the left, and parameters from Theorem 17
on the right.
Theorem 26 ([44, Theorem 7.1]) Theorem 17
—– [[64, 5, 35/5]]8
—– [[64, 12, 30/4]]8
—– [[64, 9, 30/5]]8
—– [[64, 7, 30/6]]8
[[64, 6, 25/6]]8 [[64, 10, 25/6]]8
[[64, 6, 24/7]]8 [[64, 10, 24/7]]8
[[64, 50, 5/4]]8 [[64, 51, 5/4]]8
Table 3: Comparison of code parameters in Example 8. Parameters from Theorem 26
on the left and parameters from Theorem 17 on the right.
We next consider asymmetric quantum codes with q = 8 and of length 64. Our
theorem treats many more constellations of dz/dx with dz ≥ dx than does Theorem 26.
For instance, the highest value of dz treated by Theorem 26 is dz = 31, whereas
Theorem 17 describes 35 different nested code pairs with dz ≥ 32. In most cases the
code parameters guaranteed by Theorem 17 are much better than the parameters
described in Theorem 26. However, there are also cases where the situation is the
opposite. From the huge amount of obtainable values dz/dx we display in Table 3
some representative examples that illustrate the situation. Again all listed codes
coming from Theorem 17 strictly exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. ♦
Example 9. In this example we consider S1, S2 ⊆ F7 with #S1 = 6 and #S2 = 7
and apply Theorem 17 and Theorem 26 to construct asymmetric quantum codes of
length n = 42. In most cases Theorem 17 is much better than Theorem 26, however,
there also exists a number of cases where the latter is the best. Table 4 displays some
illustrative examples. As in the previous example all displayed cases coming from
Theorem 17 strictly exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
♦
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Theorem 26 ([44, Theorem 7.1]) Theorem 17
—– [[42, 4, 20/5]]7
[[42, 2, 18/4]]7 [[42, 9, 18/4]]7
[[42, 6, 16/4]]7 [[42, 10, 16/4]]7
[[42, 10, 14/4]]7 [[42, 13, 14/4]]7
[[42, 14, 10/6]]7 [[42, 14, 10/6]]7
[[42, 16, 9/6]]7 [[42, 15, 9/6]]7
[[42, 24, 7/4]]7 [[42, 23, 7/4]]7
[[42, 28, 5/4]]7 [[42, 29, 5/4]]7
Table 4: Comparison of code parameters in Example 9. Parameters from Theorem 26
on the left and parameters from Theorem 17 on the right.
Example 10. This is a continuation of Example 7. From Table 1 one can show that
all related asymmetric quantum codes strictly exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound
(Theorem 4). The details are left for the reader.
We conclude this section with an example illustrating how to derive relative gen-
eralized Hamming weights of the considered codes. Recall from Section 1 that such
information directly translates into information on the privacy numbers and the re-
construction numbers of the corresponding ramp secret sharing schemes.
Example 11. In this example we apply Theorem 16 to estimate the parameters
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)), Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥), v = 1, . . . ,#L1 − #L2 = 7 where L1 and
L2 are as in (9) and (10), respectively. See Figure 4. Recall that the monomial
N21 N26 N30 N33 N35 N36
N15 N20 N25 N29 N32 N34
N10 N14 N19 N24 N28 N31
N6 N9 N13 N18 N23 N27
N3 N5 N8 N12 N17 N22
N1 N2 N4 N7 N11 N16
Figure 4: The situation in Example 11: L2 corresponds to the circled monomials and
L1 equals L2 plus the boxed monomials.
ordering, that we use in this example, is the degree lexicographic ordering ≺deg. We
therefore obtain u = min{i | Ni ∈ L1\L2} = 8 and u
⊥ = max{i | Ni ∈ L1} = 19.
Hence, (3) becomes
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min
{
D(K) | K ⊆ {N8, N9, N10
N11, N12, N13, N14, N15, N18, N19},#K = v
}
,
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v 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ 12 15 16 18 20 22 23
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ 6 8 9 11 12 14 15
Table 5: Estimated relative generalized Hamming weights of the code pair in Exam-
ple 11.
v 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
tv ≥ 5 7 8 10 11 13 14
rv ≤ 25 22 21 19 17 15 14
Table 6: Privacy numbers and reconstruction numbers of the ramp secret sharing
scheme described in Example 11.
and (4) becomes
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min
{
D⊥(K) | K ⊆ {N8, N9, N12
N13, N14, N16, N17, N18, N19},#K = v
}
.
Going through all possible combinations we obtain the information in Table 5. Hence,
we can construct a ramp secret sharing scheme over F7 with n = 36 participants, with
the secrets belonging to F77 and with the privacy numbers being as in Table 6.
♦
4 Relatively small codimension
In the former section we demonstrated how to construct good pairs of nested codes
having relatively large codimension. We now show how to obtain good pairs of nested
codes with relatively small codimension. To explain the idea behind our method, we
start with an example which leads to a formal statement in Theorem 27 below.
Example 12. This is a continuation of the series of examples where we consider codes
over F∗7 × F
∗
7, and where we use the degree lexicographic ordering ≺deg. Consider
L1 = {X
αY β ∈ ∆(6, 6) | XαY β deg XY
3}, (13)
L2 = {X
αY β ∈ ∆(6, 6) | XαY β ≺deg X
3Y }. (14)
The situation is described in Figure 5
The codimension is 3 and the values of u and u⊥ in Theorem 16 become u = min{i |
Ni ∈ L1\L2} = 12 (corresponding to Nu = X
3Y ), and u⊥ = max{i | Ni ∈ L1} = 14
(corresponding to Nu⊥ = XY
3). By inspection we see that, due to the particular
choice of L1 and L2, in (3) and (4) of Theorem 16 we need only to consider monomials
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N21 N26 N30 N33 N35 N36
N15 N20 N25 N29 N32 N34
N10 N14 N19 N24 N28 N31
N6 N9 N13 N18 N23 N27
N3 N5 N8 N12 N17 N22
N1 N2 N4 N7 N11 N15
Figure 5: The situation in Example 12: The circled monomials correspond to L2.
The circled and the boxed monomials correspond to L1.
v 1 2 3
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ 15 19 22
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ 8 11 13
Table 7: Estimated relative generalized Hamming weights of the first code pair in
Example 12
in L1\L2. That is, we obtain
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min{D(K) | K ⊆ {X
3Y,X2Y 2, XY 3},#K = v},
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min{D⊥(K) | K ⊆ {X3Y,X2Y 2, XY 3},#K = v},
for v = 1, 2, 3. From this we easily obtain the parameters in Table 7.
In a similar way we have in (3) and (4) only monomials from L1\L2, if in (13) and
(14) we replace (XY 3, X3Y ) with (XY,XY ), (XY 2, X2Y ), (X2Y 2, X2Y 2), (XY 4, X4Y ),
(X2Y 3, X3Y 2), (X2Y 4, X4Y 2), (X3Y 3, X3Y 3), (X3Y 4, X4Y 3), or (X4Y 4, X4Y 4). How-
ever, due to symmetry, we only need to consider the first five cases (in addition to the
case that we have already considered). For instance from (X4Y 4, X4Y 4) we derive
the same estimates for Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) and Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥), respectively, as
we would derive from (XY,XY ) for Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) and Mv(C(L1), C(L2)), re-
spectively (the order of parameters being reversed). In Table 8 we list our estimates
of relative minimum distances and these are compared to the estimates of minimum
distances to demonstrate the advantage of the proposed code construction. In this
example we did in (13) and (14), not consider replacing XY 3 and X3Y , respectively,
with Y a and Xa, respectively. The arguments of the example surely would apply also
in this case, however, the corresponding nested codes are of Reed-Muller type, and
such codes do not have impressive parameters. ♦
The method of Example 12 can be applied to any point set S1×S2 with s = #S1 =
#S2. The idea is to consider the intersection of a line with slope −1 and the lattice
∆(s, s). From either direction, both values D(X iY j) and D⊥(X iY j) strictly increase,
while moving on the line segment toward its middle. Hence, choosing L2 ⊂ L1 in such
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ℓ = #L1 −#L2 1 2 3 1 4 2
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ 25 20 15 16 10 12
d(C(L1)) ≥ 24 18 12 12 6 6
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1))
⊥ ≥ 4 6 8 9 10 12
d(C(L2)
⊥) ≥ 3 4 5 5 6 6
Table 8: The first weights in Example 12.
a way that L1\L2 is equal to a center part of a line segment of slope −1 produces
good relative minimum distances.
Theorem 27. Consider S1, S2 ⊆ Fq with s = #S1 = #S2. Let I = 〈F1(X), F2(Y )〉 ⊂
Fq[X, Y ], where F1 and F2 are as in (2). Consider X
iY j ∈ ∆(s, s) with i ≤ j and let
L1 = {N ∈ ∆(s, s) | N deg X
iY j}, (15)
L2 = {N ∈ ∆(s, s) | N ≺deg X
jY i}. (16)
The codes C(L1) and C(L2) are of length n = s
2 and their codimension equals ℓ =
j − i+ 1. The relative minimum distances satisfy
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) = (s− i)(s− j), (17)
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥ ≥ (i+ 1)(j + 1), (18)
and for v = 2, . . . , ℓ
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) = (s− i)(s− j) +
v∑
t=2
(
(s− i)− (t− 1)
)
(19)
= (s− i)(s− j + v − 1)−
v(v − 1)
2
,
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ (i+ 1)(j + 1) +
v∑
t=2
(
(j + 1)− (t− 1)
)
(20)
= (i+ v)(j + 1)−
v(v − 1)
2
.
Proof. We first establish the bounds
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min
{
D(K) | K ⊆ {XjY i, Xj−1Y i+1,
. . . , X iY j},#K = v
}
, (21)
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min
{
D⊥(K) | K ⊆ {XjY i, Xj−1Y i+1,
. . . , X iY j},#K = v
}
. (22)
We do this by applying Theorem 16 with ≺deg as the chosen monomial ordering. In
particular ∆(s, s) = {N1, . . . , Ns2} where the enumeration of the Nis is with respect
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to ≺deg. Consider u = min{i | Ni ∈ L1\L2} and u
⊥ = max{i | Ni ∈ L1}. The uth
element of ∆(s, s) now is Nu = X
jY i and the u⊥th element is Nu⊥ = X
iY j . By (3)
and (4) the right-hand sides of (21) and (22) therefore serve as lower bounds on their
respective left-hand sides.
We next prove (17) and (18). From (21) we have
M1(C(L1), C(L2))
≥ min{D(XjY i), D(Xj−1Y i+1), . . . , D(X iY j)}
= min{(s− (i+ v))(s− (j − v)) | v = 0, . . . , ℓ− 1 = j − i}
= (s− i)(s− j)
(equality of the convex function is attained for v = 0 and v = ℓ−1). This proves that
the right-hand side of (17) is larger than or equal to the left-hand side. In a similar
fashion we establish the inequality (18). To establish equality in (17) we only need
to find a codeword in C(L1)\C(L2) with (s− i)(s− j) non-zeros. To this end, write
S1 = {α1, . . . , αs} and S2 = {β1, . . . , βs} and consider
F (X, Y ) =
i∏
w=1
(X − αw)
j∏
r=1
(Y − βr)
which has exactly the prescribed number of non-zeros in S1 × S2. The codeword
~c = ev(F (X, Y ) + I) clearly belongs to C(L1)\C(L2) and therefore we have estab-
lished equality in (17).
In a similar way we can show that equality actually holds in (21). This is done by
considering for each possible set K ⊆ {XjY i, Xj−1Y i+1, . . . , X iY j} the correspond-
ing set of #K polynomials as above. The number of elements in S1 × S2, that are
non-zeros of at least one of these polynomials, equals D(K).
It remains to show that the right-hand side of (21) equals the right-hand side of (19),
and that the right-hand side of (22) equals the right-hand side of (20). For conve-
nience, we will explain the case in (19) for v = 2. The cases v ≥ 3 can be proved with
the same reasoning by using the principle of inclusion and exclusion. A similar and
straightforward reasoning, where one should replace (s− i)(s− j) with (i+1)(j + 1)
gives the corresponding formula for the case in (20).
Indeed, we are considering sets K = {Xj−xY i+x, Xj−yY i+y}, where one can assume
0 ≤ x < y ≤ j− i = ℓ− 1. Then D(K) equals the cardinality of the set of monomials
which are divisible by either Xj−xY i+x or Xj−yY i+y. So, we have to compute the sum
of the cardinalities of the set of monomials divisible by Xj−xY i+x plus that of the set
of monomials divisible by Xj−yY i+y minus that of the set of monomials divisible by
both of them. Therefore,
D(K) =
(
(s− j) + x
)(
(s− i)− x
)
+
(
(s− j) + y
)(
(s− i)− y
)
−
(
(s− j) + x
)(
(s− i)− y
)
.
We are looking for the minimum of that function within the above mentioned region.
Derivatives show that the minimum will appear on the boundary. As a consequence
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we find it for the values x = 0 and y = 1 which give the value (s−i)(s−j)+(s−i−1)
in the statement. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 28. Let the notation be as in Theorem 27 and consider σ ∈ {0, . . . , s−
1}. Then for any positive integer ℓ ≤ σ+1 such that ℓ is even if and only if σ is odd
we obtain nested code pairs C(L2) ⊂ C(L1) of codimension ℓ with
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) =
(
s−
σ − ℓ+ 1
2
)(
s−
σ + ℓ− 1
2
)
(23)
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥
(
σ − ℓ+ 3
2
)(
σ + ℓ+ 1
2
)
(24)
and if ℓ ≤ σ − 1 then
d(C(L1)) = s(s− σ) < M1(C(L1), C(L2)). (25)
Similarly we obtain code pairs of codimension ℓ with
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) =
(
σ − ℓ+ 3
2
)(
σ + ℓ+ 1
2
)
(26)
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥
(
s−
σ − ℓ+ 1
2
)(
s−
σ + ℓ− 1
2
)
(27)
and if ℓ ≤ σ − 1 then
d(C(L1)) = σ + 1 < M1(C(L1), C(L2)).
Proof. We only prove (23), (24) and (25). The other results follow by symmetry.
Choose 0 ≤ i ≤ j < s with i + j = σ < s and ℓ = j − i + 1. Then i = σ−ℓ+1
2
,
j = σ+ℓ−1
2
and the first two results follow from Theorem 27. Finally, d(C(L1)) =
M1(C(L1), {~0}) = D(X
σ) = s(s− σ).
Corollary 29. Consider integers 1 < s ≤ q, where q is a prime power and let
σ ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1}. Then for any ℓ ≤ σ + 1 such that ℓ is even if and only if σ is
odd we obtain from Proposition 28 ramp secret sharing schemes over Fq with n = s
2
participants, shares in Fℓq and either
t = t1 ≥
(
σ − ℓ+ 3
2
)(
σ + ℓ+ 1
2
)
− 1
r = rℓ = s
2 −
(
s−
σ − ℓ + 1
2
)(
s−
σ + ℓ− 1
2
)
+ 1
or
t = t1 ≥
(
s−
σ − ℓ+ 1
2
)(
s−
σ + ℓ− 1
2
)
− 1
r = rℓ = s
2 −
(
σ − ℓ + 3
2
)(
σ + ℓ+ 1
2
)
+ 1.
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Similarly we obtain asymmetric quantum codes with parameters
[[n = s2, ℓ, dz/dx]]q
where dz equals the right hand side of (23) and dx is greater than or equal to the right
hand side of (24) (and similarly with (26) and (27)). If ℓ ≤ σ−1 then the asymmetric
quantum codes are impure.
Remark 30. As mentioned in the introduction it is often desirable to have asym-
metric quantum codes with dz much larger than dx. One such family is obtained
from Corollary 29 with parameters [[n = s2, ℓ, dz ≥ s(s − ℓ + 1)/dx = ℓ]]q for any
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , s− 1}. For q = 7, 8, 9 and ℓ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 these codes strictly exceed the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound (Theorem 4). Similarly for q = 5, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 23, 25
and ℓ = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Example 13. In this example we consider asymmetric quantum codes as in Corol-
lary 29 with dz = δ being equal to the right hand side of (23) and dx being greater
than or equal to δ⊥ which we define as the right hand side of (24). We treat the
cases n = q2, where q = 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9. In the literature e.g. [42, 17, 44] one can find
extensive tables of quantum stabilizer code parameters derived by applying Theo-
rem 3, however, they only use the bound dz ≥ d(C1) and dx ≥ d(C
⊥
2 ), where d(C1)
and d(C⊥2 ) are the minimum distances of concrete code pairs with C2 ⊂ C1. The
present example illustrates the huge advantage of using instead the relative minimum
distances (which is what is behind the bounds in Corollary 29). This is done by
investigating for each ℓ and δ what is the highest value g(ℓ, δ) such that the tables
of best known linear codes in [34] guarantee the existence of linear code pairs A,B⊥
satisfying dimA − dimB = ℓ, d(A) ≥ δ, and d(B⊥) ≥ g(ℓ, δ) (this is in the spirit
of [18, Theorem 2]). Observe, that we make no assumption whatsoever that B ⊂ A.
Actually, such inclusion is very unlikely to hold when one chooses two codes A and
B⊥ which are optimal with respect to the tables of best known linear codes in [34]. In
Table 9 we list values of (ℓ, δ, δ⊥, g(ℓ, δ)). The many cases where δ⊥ is close to g(ℓ, δ)
illustrate the huge advantage of using the construction in Theorem 27 and taking into
account the relative minimum distances. Note that, there are even two cases where
δ⊥ exceeds the corresponding g(ℓ, δ), namely for q = 7 and (ℓ, δ, δ⊥, g(ℓ, δ)) equal to
(3, 15, 15, 14) or (2, 30, 6, 5). All displayed code parameters coming from Theorem 27
strictly exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (Theorem 4).
♦
It is not straightforward to generalize Theorem 27 to point ensembles S1×S2 with
#S1 not necessarily equal to#S2. The problem lies in the choice of monomial ordering
(and the corresponding definition of L1 and L2). More concretely, for #S1 6= #S2
there simply is no monomial ordering which simultaneously optimizes the relative
minimum distance of the corresponding primary codes and the relative minimum
distance of the corresponding dual codes. However, our method can still be applied
as the following example illustrates.
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q (ℓ, δ, δ⊥, g(ℓ, δ))
3 (1,4,4,4)
4 (2,6,6,6) (1,9,4,4)
5 (3,8,9,9) (1,9,9,9) (2,12,6,6) (1,16,4,4)
7 (5,12,12,18) (3,15,15,14) (1,16,16,17) (4,18,10,13)
(2,20,12,12) (3,24,8,9) (1,25,9,10) (2,30,6,5)
(1,36,4,4)
8 (5,21,12,19) (3,24,15,16) (1,25,16,16) (4,18,18,21)
(2,20,20,22) (4,28,10,13) (2,30,12,13) (3,35,8,8)
(1,36,9,10) (2,42,6,6) (1,49,4,4)
9 (3,24,24,26) (1,25,25,26) (5,21,21,27) (4,28,18,21)
(2,30,20,22) (5,32,12,18) (3,35,15,16) (1,36,16,16)
(4,40,10,13) (2,42,12,14) (3,48,8,8) (1,49,9,9)
(2,56,6,6) (1,64,4,4)
Table 9: Corresponding values of (ℓ, δ, δ⊥, g(ℓ, δ)) from Example 13. The many cases
with δ⊥ close to g(ℓ, δ) (and even two cases with δ⊥ > g(ℓ, δ)) demonstrate the
advantage of the construction in Theorem 27 and of using relative minimum distances.
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8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2
24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3
32 28 24 20 16 12 8 4
40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 6: Example 14: D(N) to the left, and D⊥(N) to the right
Example 14. In this example we consider S1, S2 ⊆ Fq with s1 = #S1 = 8, s2 =
#S2 = 5 and consider codes defined from S1× S2. Here q is any prime power greater
than or equal to 8. In Figure 6 we depict on the left D(∆(s1, s2)) and on the right
D⊥(∆(s1, s2)).
Concentrating first on the lower left corner of ∆(s1, s2) we see that on a line
segment of slope −1 the values D⊥(X iY j) indeed still increase when moving from
either direction toward the middle of the segment. This, however, does not at all
hold for D(X iY j). For instance if we choose
L1 = {N ∈ ∆(s1, s2) | N deg XY
2},
L2 = {N ∈ ∆(s1, s2) | N ≺deg X
2Y },
then in (3) and (4) of Theorem 16 we only need to consider monomials in L1\L2 =
{X2Y,XY 2}. Hence, we obtain the estimates M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min{21, 24} = 21
and M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ 6. But this seems somewhat not a perfect choice of L2 ⊂
L1 as now min{D(M) | M ∈ L1} = min{D(M) | M ∈ L1\L2}. Hence, we optimized
the relative minimum distance of the dual codes, but did not obtain any improvement
for the primary codes. Turning to the right upper corner of ∆(s1, s2) the situation is
similar, however, with the role of the primary and dual codes interchanged. We finally
consider the remaining middle part of∆(s1, s2). We first choose as monomial ordering
the weighted degree lexicographic ordering ≺w defined by the rule that X
i1Y i2 ≺w
Xj1Y j2 if either i1 + 2i2 < j1 + 2j2, or i1 + 2i2 = j1 + 2j2 with i2 < j2. Then define
L1 = {N ∈ ∆(s1, s2) | N w X
2Y 2},
L2 = {N ∈ ∆(s1, s2) | N ≺w X
4Y }.
Again this renders the nice property that in (3) and (4) we only need to consider the
monomials of L1\L2, which in this case becomes {X
4Y,X2Y 2}. We obtain
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min{16, 18} = 16,
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min{9, 10} = 9.
Choosing on the other hand the degree lexicographic ordering and defining
L1 = {N ∈ ∆(s1, s2) | N deg X
2Y 2},
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L2 = {N ∈ ∆(s1, s2) | N ≺deg X
3Y },
we only need to consider monomials in L1\L2 = {X
3Y,X2Y 2}, from which we obtain
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) ≥ min{18, 20} = 18 and M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min{8, 9} = 8.
As a consequence, there seems to be no general rule for which (weighted) degree
lexicographic ordering to choose. ♦
We now return to the case of the point set being a Cartesian product of subsets
Si ⊆ Fq of the same size. Theorem 27 treated the two-dimensional case, the theorem
below treats higher dimensions.
Theorem 31. Consider S1, . . . , Sm ⊆ Fq with s = #S1 = · · · = #Sm and let
〈F1(X1), . . . , Fm(Xm)〉 ⊂ Fq[X1, . . . , Xm], where F1, . . . Fm are as in (2). Consider
X i11 X
i2
2 · · ·X
im
m ∈ ∆(s, . . . , s) with i1 ≤ i2 and let
L1 = {N ∈ ∆(s, . . . , s) | N deg X
i1
1 X
i2
2 · · ·X
im
m },
L2 = {N ∈ ∆(s, . . . , s) | N ≺deg X
i2
1 X
i1
2 X
i3
3 · · · , X
im
m }.
The codes C(L1) and C(L2) are of length n = s
m and their codimension equals ℓ =
i2 − i1 + 1. The relative minimum distances satisfy
M1(C(L1), C(L2)) = (s− i1) · · · (s− im)
M1(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥ ≥ (i1 + 1) · · · (im + 1),
and for v = 2, . . . , ℓ
Mv(C(L1), C(L2)) = min
{
D(K) | K ⊆ {X i21 X
i1
2 X
i3
3 · · ·X
im
m ,
. . . , X i11 X
i2
2 · · ·X
im
m },#K = v
}
,
Mv(C(L2)
⊥, C(L1)
⊥) ≥ min
{
D⊥(K) | K ⊆ {X i21 X
i1
2 X
i3
3 · · ·X
im
m ,
. . . , X i11 X
i2
2 · · ·X
im
m },#K = v
}
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 27. The details are left for the reader.
We next return to the two-dimensional case, comparing in an example asymmetric
quantum codes from Corollary 29 with La Guardia’s Construction II of asymmetric
quantum generalized Reed-Solomon codes (Theorem 26). Recall from Remark 5 that
parameters of asymmetric quantum codes based on the CSS construction can be
directly translated into parameters of ramp secret sharing schemes.
Example 15. We first consider the case of asymmetric quantum codes with q = 7
and of length 49. The parameters produced by Theorem 26 for the code length 49
all satisfy that dz, dx ≤ 6. To produce higher values of dz (as usual we shall assume
dz ≥ dx), we can instead apply Theorem 26 to codes of length 48 and thereby derive
information on codes of length 49. We then compare these values with what is pro-
duced from Theorem 27 in combination with Theorem 3 for codes of length 49. As
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Theorem 26 ([44, Theorem 7.1]) Theorem 27
—– [[49, 1, 31/4]]7
—– [[49, 2, 30/6]]7
—– [[49, 1, 25/9]]7
[[49, 2, 23/2]]7 [[49, 3, 24/8]]7
[[49, 2, 20/5]]7 [[49, 2, 20/12]]7
[[49, 2, 18/7]]7 [[49, 4, 18/10]]7
[[49, 2, 16/9]]7 [[49, 1, 16/16]]7
[[49, 2, 15/10]]7 [[49, 3, 15/15]]7
[[49, 6, 12/11]]7 [[49, 5, 12/12]]7
Table 10: Comparison of code parameters in Example 15. To the right all possible
parameters derived using Theorem 27. To the left a selection of parameters derived
by applying Theorem 26 to codes of length 48. An empty entry means that there are
no comparable parameter.
is seen in Table 10, most often Theorem 27 produces the best results. All displayed
codes coming from Theorem 27 strictly exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (Theo-
rem 4).
We next consider asymmetric quantum codes with q = 8 and of length 64. In Ta-
ble 11 we compare representative examples of what can be derived from Theorem 26
with what can be obtained from Theorem 27 in combination with Theorem 3. Again
the advantage of our method is distinct in most cases, however, with a clear exception
when dz = 14. For dz > 31, Theorem 26 does not produce any information, which in
Table 11 is marked with “—–”. All displayed codes coming from Theorem 27 strictly
exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound (Theorem 4).
♦
We conclude this section with discussing higher weights and their use in secret
sharing.
Remark 32. Inspecting (19) and (20) it is clear that the (v+1)th relative weights are
typically much larger than the vth relative weights, for v ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ−1}. In particular
the second relative weights are often much larger than the first relative weights. The
consequence for the related ramp secret sharing schemes is that the security is much
better than what is reflected only by the parameter t = t1, in that tv+1 is much
larger than tv for v ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ− 1}. Hence, if a small amount of information leakage
can be accepted, then one can tolerate many more leaked symbols. In the other
direction, reconstruction corresponds to solving a system of linear equations. Hence,
the fact that rv is much smaller than rv+1 for v ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ − 1}, and in particular
that rℓ−1 is much smaller than r = rℓ, means that if one is willing to guess some of
the indeterminates of the system then one needs much fewer shares to reconstruct
the secret.
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Theorem 26 ([44, Theorem 7.1]) Theorem 27
—– [[64, 1, 49/4]]8
—– [[64, 2, 42/6]]8
—– [[64, 1, 36/9]]8
—– [[64, 3, 35/8]]8
[[64, 2, 30/3]]8 [[64, 2, 30/12]]8
[[64, 4, 28/4]]8 [[64, 4, 28/10]]8
[[64, 2, 25/8]]8 [[64, 1, 25/16]]8
[[64, 2, 24/9]]8 [[64, 3, 24/15]]8
[[64, 2, 21/12]]8 [[64, 5, 21/12]]8
[[64, 2, 20/13]]8 [[64, 2, 20/20]]8
[[64, 4, 18/14]]8 [[64, 4, 18/18]]8
Table 11: Comparison of code parameters in Example 15. To the right all possible
parameters from Theorem 27. To the left a selection of parameters resulting from
Theorem 26.
ℓ t1 t2 t3 t4 r1 r2 r3 r4
1 24 - - - 33 - - -
2 19 23 - - 29 31 - -
3 14 18 21 - 24 26 29 -
1 15 - - - 28 - - -
4 9 13 16 18 18 20 23 27
1 8 - - - 21 - - -
3 7 10 12 - 15 18 22 -
2 5 7 - - 13 17 - -
1 3 - - - 12 - - -
Table 12: Ramp secret sharing schemes from Example 16
We illustrate Remark 32 with an example.
Example 16. This is a continuation of Example 12. Applying Theorem 27 we obtain
ramp secret sharing schemes with n = 36 participants, with secrets in Fℓq where ℓ and
the privacy and reconstruction numbers are as in Table 12.
♦
5 Concluding remarks
In a series of works [26, 24, 27, 25, 23] the authors of the present paper investigated
linear codes over Fq defined by evaluating multivariate polynomials at Cartesian prod-
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ucts S1 × · · · × Sm, where for i = 1, . . . , m, Si is the set of roots of
XNii −Xi or X
Ni−1
i − 1. (28)
Here Ni > 1 satisfies that Ni − 1 divides q − 1. Such codes were then used in [26,
24, 27, 25, 23] for the construction of symmetric quantum codes. In the terminology
used in these papers a set J ⊆ {1, . . . , m} indicates for which indices the second
case in (28) occurs – and the corresponding codes are called J-affine variety codes,
and if Ni − 1 = q − 1, J = {1, . . . , m} generalized toric codes [49]. One of the
advantages of such codes is that they come with an efficient method for finding parity
check matrices. More precisely, when each row in the generator matrix is made by
evaluating a monomial at the points of the point set, then [27, Proposition 1] provides
a description of a corresponding parity check matrix. The codes of the present paper
clearly are J-affine variety codes when Si, i = 1, . . . , m is of the form (28). This is in
particular the case in all the examples we have given, implying that for these codes
we can easily establish parity check matrices.
Another advantage of J-affine variety codes is that they are suited for the construc-
tion of subfield subcodes. It is an interesting topic of future research to investigate if
the method from the present paper can be successfully combined with such subfield
subcode construction.
For q an even power of a prime, Theorem 3 is also true if one replaces the Eu-
clidean duality with the Hermitian duality [19, Theorem 4.5]. It is also an interesting
research problem to investigate if this product can be successfully combined with the
methods of the present paper.
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A Proof of Lemma 21
Proof. Let m ≥ 2 be an arbitrary integer. The proof is by induction on i = m, . . . , 1.
For i = m the formula reduces to∫ s− τ
(s−x1)···(s−xm−1)
0
dxm = s−
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xm−1)
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which is indeed true. Next let 1 ≤ i < m and assume that the formula in the lemma
holds when i is substituted with i + 1. We must show that it also holds for i. The
left hand side becomes∫ s− τ
sm−i(s−x1)···(s−xi−1)
0
sm−i
−
m−i−1∑
t=0
1
t!
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi)
(
ln
(
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi)s
m−i
τ
))t
dxi
= sm−i+1 −
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)
+
m−i−1∑
t=0
∫ s− τ
sm−i(s−x1)···(s−xi−1)
0
1
t!
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)
−1
(s− xi)
·
(
ln
(
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi)s
m−i
τ
))t
dxi. (29)
We continue with the last term, which after the substitution,
u = ln((s− x1) · · · (s− xi)s
m−i/τ),
becomes
m−i−1∑
t=0
∫ 0
ln
(
(s−x1)···(s−xi−1)s
m−i+1
τ
) 1
t!
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)
ut du
= −
m−i−1∑
t=0
1
(t + 1)!
τ
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)
(
ln
(
(s− x1) · · · (s− xi−1)s
m−i+1
τ
))t+1
.
Shifting the index by 1 in the last sum and collecting terms in (29) prove the lemma.
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